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REPLY: CRIMINAL LAW'S PATHOLOGY
William J. Stuntz*
I thank Kyron Huigens for devoting his time and his considerable
talent to responding' to my article,

The Pathological Politics of
Criminal Law.2 I also thank editors of the Michigan Law Review for

giving me the opportunity to reply.
It is best to begin by defining the contested territory. Huigens and
I agree (I think) on three propositions. First, American criminal law,
both federal and state, is very broad; it covers a great deal more con
duct than most people would expect. Second, American criminal law is
very deep: that which it criminalizes, it criminalizes repeatedly, so that
a single incident can yield a dozen or more separate charges.3 Third,
because criminal law has these features, a great many defendants
plead guilty who might win at trial given more reasonable criminal
liability rules, and a smaller but still significant number of defendants
lose the opportunity to raise substantive legal claims they could have
raised if those more reasonable rules applied. These effects give
prosecutors an enormous amount of power. All this is common
ground.4
We disagree about two important things. Huigens believes that the
nature of criminal law and criminal lawmaking may not be a large
problem - overcriminalization may be no more than a "benign"
response to the public's desire to use criminal law to make symbolic
statements.5 And he believes that if there is a problem, it lies in the
triumph of consequentialism as the reigning theory of criminal pun
ishment.6 Both points are, like all Huigens' work, very interesting; I

*
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University of Virginia. - Ed. I thank Dan Meltzer, Carol Steiker, and Dan Richman for
helpful comments.

1. Kyron Huigens,

What Is and ls Not Pathological in Criminal Law,

811 (2002).
2. William J. Stuntz,
(2001).

The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law,

101 MICH. L. REV.

100 MICH. L. REV. 505

3. The presence of overlapping crimes also allows prosecutors to offer or threaten a
range of sentences - a useful posture for plea bargaining. For a wonderful example under
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, see Jeffrey Standen, Plea Bargaining in the Shadow of
the Guidelines, 81 CAL. L. REV. 147 l, 1506-10 (1993).
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4. Huigens concedes these points in the first page of his essay. Huigens, supra note 1, at
5.

See id.

6. Id.

at 812, 814-15.

at 812, 819-21.
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enjoyed and profited from his essay. And the argument about conse
quentialism has substantial f orce. But I think neither point is co�rect.
Criminal law's breadth and depth are not benign. Among other
bad effects, these features of criminal law utterly undo the accuracy
enhancing features of the law of criminal procedure. The result is that
we are probably sending a large number7 of peopl_e .to prison based on
conduct that is technically criminal (though the ability to stack charges
puts even that conclusion in doubt) but functionally innocent. That
problem alone should suffice to show that criminal law is diseased, and
seriously so.
And consequentialism is not the germ that produced this disease.
It is not clear that any idea or theory has done so; I suspect the key
culprit is a uniquely bad set of institutional arrangements. But if an
idea is the culprit, the idea is not consequentialist. Rather, the intellec
tual villain is the cluster of principles that criminal lawyers call "the
rule of law." The irony is thick: we have a deeply lawless criminal jus
tice system in part because that system is deeply committed to legality.
That truth does not depend on whether the system is consequentialist,
retributive, or rehabilitative. Theories of punishment matter, but their
largest effect is on sentencing practices, not on criminal liability rules.
I.

TH E PATHOLOGY

Huigens argues that I have miscategorized the problem with criminal law:
Imbalances of power in a constitutional system may be dangerous, un
wise, or unjust, but at the same time benign - in that they are internal,
inevitable, cyclical shifts of power.... [I]t is possible to place a benign
construction on prosecutorial dominance in contemporary criminal law.
Overcriminalization may be the distorted, misguided, but fundamentally
legitimate expression of an expectation that the aims of the criminal law
will parallel the aims of ordinary morality. If so, then overcriminalization
is not pathological.8

I can embrace most of the adjectives Huigens uses in this passage dangerous, unwise, unjust, distorted, misguided, even legitimate (I do
not think criminal law's problems are the product of a coup). I object
only to three: cyclical, inevitable, and benign.

7. Given the size of our prison and jail population - in excess of two million - the
number of innocents may be large even if the percentage is quite small. But the percentage
may be larger than one would think. If the threat of trial is not inducing careful screening by
police and prosecutors, then those officials' sense of obligation is the only force left to do
that job. It seems unduly optimistic to assume police officers and prosecutors do their jobs
not just well but extremely well, even though errors are almost certain to go undiscovered.
The more plausible assumption is that there will be a large number of errors.
8. Huigens, supra note 1, at 812.
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Cycles turn. One side of the wheel is up today, a different side
tomorrow. Power does shift cyclically in some areas: Congress is more
powerful and Presidents are weaker at some times than at others. But
there is nothing cyclical about prosecutorial power. At all times, it
grows. Look at any state's criminal code at any two dates; the later
version will cover a good deal more ground than the earlier one.9 That
is especially true of the federal criminal code, which seems to expand
exponentially.10 More criminalization means more policymaking space
for prosecutors; like most regulatory statutes, criminal prohibitions are
delegations of power to the officials who enforce them.11 The number
and scope of the delegations are constantly increasing. Prosecutorial
power does not ebb and flow. It always flows.
That state of affairs is not inevitable, at least not in the strong
sense of that word. Consider the contrast between criminal justice and
most other forms of government regulation. Save for the divide be
tween parliamentary and presidential systems,12 governments of first
world countries look alike. Powerful national legislatures, still more
powerful executives (sometimes responsible to the legislature, some
times not), large centralized bureaucracies - these things are present
in all wealthy liberal democracies. One might fairly infer that these
things are inevitable, at least in countries with democratic traditions
and high per capita GDP. Criminal prosecution is different. In most of
the world, it is the province of bureaucrats, not elected officials. Those
bureaucrats generally work for national governments, not for local
ones. Meanwhile, the overwhelming majority of American prosecutors
work for local governments, and their offices are headed by elected
district attorneys.13 Most importantly, other countries' prosecutors do
not appear to exercise the kind of broad policymaking power their

9. See Stuntz, supra note 2, at 513-14 (discussing changes in the Illinois, Massachusetts,
and Virginia codes over time). The only exception is in states that revised their codes to
approximate the Model Penal Code. In those states, there was sometimes a temporary (but
only temporary) decline in the number and scope of criminal offenses. See id. at 514.
10. See id. at 5 14-15. For more detailed discussions that focus on recent developments,
see NANCY E. MARION, A HISTORY OF FEDERAL CRIME CONTROL INITIATIVES, 1960-1993
(1994); TASK FORCE ON THE FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW, AMERICAN BAR Ass'N,
THE FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW ( 1998).
11. Outside the criminal justice system, these delegations are heavily constrained by
oversight both from the executive and from the legislature. Similar constraints are absent in
the realm of criminal prosecution: even in the federal system, prosecutors face almost no
oversight from either quarter. For the best discussion, see Daniel C. Richman, Federal
Criminal Law, Congressional Delegation, and Enforcement Discretion, 46 UCLA L. REV.
757 (1999).
12. For a wonderful discussion of that divide, see Bruce Ackerman,
HARV. L. REV. 633 (2000).

The New Separation

of Powers, 113

13. More than ninety-five percent of local prosecutors' offices are headed by an elected
district attorney. See JOHN M. DAWSON ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PROSECUTORS IN
STATE COURTS, 1992, at 2 (1993).
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American counterparts wield. I suspect a German or French or
Japanese prosecutor would be astonished at the thought that she, or
her office, should decide to enforce some drug laws but not others.
American prosecutors (and American police f orces) do that as a mat
ter of course.
Notice the difference. The growth of a large administrative arm of
the national government seems to be a natural part of liberal democ
racies' development. The rise of prosecutors with unreviewable
authority to define what criminal law means in their jurisdiction is not
like that: it happened here, but it is not clear that it has happened
anywhere else. That does not make the case f or inevitability.
Consider another feature of American criminal justice: the domi
nance of plea bargaining - not under the table with winks and nods,
but out in the open, with prosecutors and defense attorneys settling
criminal cases the way civil litigators do. George Fisher's brilliant
work on that subject shows how a series of path-dependent changes in
nineteenth-century criminal litigation produced the kind of plea
bargaining we see today.14 Yet plea bargaining can be changed indeed, it can be abolished, as Stephen Schulhofer's thorough study of
criminal litigation in Philadelphia in the 1980s showed.15 I think
something similar is true of American-style prosecutorial discretion. It
arose, as plea bargaining arose, out of a series of seemingly unrelated
nineteenth-century developments that combined in ways no one
expected. The passage of criminal codes, the rise of professional
prosecutors, the late-nineteenth-century move to criminalize vice taken together, these things put prosecutors in the position of choos
ing not simply between strong cases and weak ones, but between
crimes worth enforcing and crimes to be used only as bargaining
chips.16 Once prosecutors could so choose, legislators had the freedom
to criminalize strategically, to ban more conduct than anyone actually
wanted to ban in order to reduce the cost of prosecution. It all hap
pened naturally. But it is not inevitable that the problem should go
uncorrected, that prosecutorial power should have continued to grow
unchecked f or the past century.
Unlike plea bargaining, prosecutorial discretion cannot simply be
abolished, and even were it possible, abolition would probably do
more harm than good. But prosecutorial power can be reined in, by
reining in substantive criminal law. I suggested some ways of doing
that in my article;17 no doubt there are others. Whether or not

14. George Fisher, Plea Bargaining's Triumph, 109 YALE L.J. 857 (2000).
15.

Stephen J. Schulhofer, ls

16. See
17. Id.

Plea Bargaining Inevitable?, 97

Stuntz, supra note 2, at 577-78.
at 587-96.

HARV L. REV. 1037

(1984).
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we embrace one of those options is our choice. This is not an
unchangeable feature of the system that we must live with.
Which brings me to the last of those three adjectives: "benign."
Here, one must distinguish between two phenomena. The first is
overbroad criminal law that is enforced largely as written. The second
is broad criminal law-as-written together with much narrower criminal
law-as-enforced. The first phenomenon may be unfortunate, but it is
benign in the sense that Huigens uses the word. The second is not. But
the second accurately describes the way American criminal law works.
The key is the size of the gap between the norms defined in crimi
nal codes and the norms that prosecutors ordinarily seek to enforce. A
large gap all but eliminates the accuracy- enhancing portion of the law
of criminal procedure. If the nominal crime is x and the real crime is
x + y, y need not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt in order for the
defendant to be found guilty.18 Either it is important to convict only
those who have violated the relevant social norms, or it isn't. If it is,
then allowing the government to criminalize more than the norms it
seeks to enforce is a very serious problem.
The problem remains serious even if legislators are not behaving
strategically. Huigens says that the law is not strategic but symbolic an effort by legislators to use criminal law to condemn wrongdoing,
not just punish it.19 Criminal codes are, on this account, immorality
codes. As morality is comprehensive, so criminal codes must be com
prehensive.
There is something to this point, but it does not show what
Huigens thinks it shows. Voters undoubtedly demand, and so legisla
tors supply, symbolic criminal legislation. Even if that were the sole
source of the problem, it would not follow that criminal Jaw's
relentless expansion is benign. To see why, take a contemporary
example where criminal Jaw is fairly close to the comprehensive moral
code Huigens imagines: deception. There are no doubt some morally
justified lies,20 but the great majority - along with the great majority
of misleading but technically true statements - are immoral. If crimi
nal law is to serve as something akin to a comprehensive moral code, it
must criminalize all those false and misleading statements. Federal
criminal law comes surprisingly close to doing just that, with its broad

18. It is not just the reasonable doubt standard that goes by the boards. Whenever a
scenario like the one described in the text produces a guilty plea, all the doctrines of criminal
procedure go by the boards. One implication is that the constitutionalization of criminal pro
cedure has contributed to the disease that afflicts criminal law. See William J. Stuntz, The
Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure am/ Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1

(1997).
19. Huigens, supra note 1, at 812.

20. For a good discussion, see SJSSELA BOK, LYING: MORAL CHOICE IN PUBLIC AND
PRIVATE LIFE ( 1978).
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intangible rights21 and false statements22 statutes, and its several hun
dred more specific bans on fraud and misrepresentation.23
The effect is predictable. Prosecutors cannot possibly enforce such
a code; there is far too much dishonesty. They might try enforcing
these broad norms randomly - like police cars giving a ticket to every
tenth driver exceeding the speed limit even by one mile per hour. But
that would mean thousands of prosecutions of defendants like Bill
Clinton or Henry Cisneros, people who lied to conceal something
embarrassing, not to steal someone else's money or to defraud the ju
dicial system.24 Such prosecutions would be unpopular, just as Ken
Starr's investigation of Clinton was unpopular. There is only one other
alternative: prosecutors enforce a different set of criminal norms than
the ones in the statute books - say, by prosecuting mostly cases of
core fraud and perjury.
So the public gets its symbolic condemnation, and the justice sys
tem enforces a defensible set of standards for criminal dishonesty.
What could be wrong with that? The answer lies in three features of
the case selection process. First, prosecutors are the ones defining
what counts as core fraud or perjury. Those definitions are unwritten
and unreviewable, and they vary from place to place and fr om time to
time, because they are wholly discretionary. That is a scandal: it means
criminal law is not, in any meaningful sense, law at all. Second, prose
cutors can abandon the norms selectively. As long as those prosecu
tions are not too common and as long as they target unpopular defen
dants, prosecutors will pay no political price for them. (Imagine if Ken
Starr were running a prosecutor's office today, and his legal guns were
trained on Martha Stewart or Kenneth Lay. One suspects his poll
numbers would look a lot better, even if the prosecutions were equally
wrong.) A legal system in which men and women are imprisoned
because they are famously unpopular, or (worse) because some gov
ernment official wants to take them down, is not a healthy system.
Third, even when prosecutors do what they are supposed to do, even
when they go after only those defendants who have lied in order to
steal something or to defraud a court, the key element of the crime the theft or the fraud on the court - need not be proved. People go to

21. 18 u.s.c. §§ 1341, 1346

(2000).

22. 18 u.s.c. § 1001 (2000).
23. A few years back, Jeffrey Standen counted 325. Jeffrey Standen, An Economic
Perspective on Federal Criminal Law Reform, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 249, 289 (1998).
24. Clinton lied in a deposition in a civil case in order to conceal an affair. Cisneros lied
to FBI agents performing a background check for the same reason. For the best discussion to
date of the facts of the Clinton case and their legal implications, see RICHARD A. POSNER,
AN AFFAIR OF STATE: THE INVESTIGATION, IMPEACHMENT, AND TRIAL OF PRESIDENT
CLINTON 16-58 (1999). On Cisneros, see, for example, Bill Miller, Cisneros Pleads Guilty to
Lying to F B I Agents: $9 Million Probe Yields Fine, No Jail, WASH. POST, Sept. 8, 1999, at
Al.
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prison when prosecutors believe they are guilty, not when some neu
tral fact finder has so decided or when the defendant has confessed.
(Notice that a guilty plea need entail only a confession to the nominal
crime, not to the real one.) It is hard to see how any of this could pos
sibly be "benign."
Criminal codes cannot do double duty, defining both morally
proper conduct and the standards that justify incarceration. If the law
plays the first role, it relinquishes the second. The result is not bad
law; it is no law at all.
Anyone who drives a car understands the relevant phenomenon. A
highway near my home25 has .. speed limit signs that ban driving over
fifty-five miles per hour. Traffic on that highway appears to move at
an average speed of about sixty-five miles per hour. Tickets are never
handed out to anyone who drives sixty or below; above that level, the
speed that will lead to a ticket is unclear - probably somewhere in the
seventy-mile-per-hour range, but it varies from day to day, presumably
depending on who is patrolling the highway.26 Surprisingly often,
criminal codes work the same way, with one key difference: those who
guess wrong about where the real boundary lies do not pay a fine they go to prison. There is no reason why criminal law must work that
way. That it does work that way shows how diseased criminal law is.
II.

THE SOURCE OF THE PATHOLOGY

Huigens attributes whatever problems criminal law has to the
triumph of consequentialism as the reigning theory of criminal pun
ishment.27 His claim is that legislators and prosecutors see punishment
as a means of quarantining dangerous people, not punishing wrongdo
ers, and that this is the logical product of American legal theory's
relentless utilitarianism. That, Huigens believes, is what has produced
broad and deep criminal liability rules.
As an explanation for contemporary American sentencing prac
tices, Huigens' argument seems plausible. As an explanation for the
century-and-a-half-long trend toward ever broader and deeper crimi
nal liability rules, it is a good deal weaker. The central problem goes to
timing. Criminal codes have been expanding, and prosecutors' powers
have been expanding along with them, for a very long time. For a
theory to cause that trend, the theory must be similarly longstanding.

25. The highway is a stretch of Route 2 just outside Boston, running from Belmont to
Concord.
26. I have no source apart from personal observation. One of the evils of this system in traffic enforcement and in criminal law more generally - is the absence of any reliable
source of information about real, as opposed to nominal, legal boundaries.
27. Huigens, supra note l, at 819-25.
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Yet theories of criminal punishment are anything but constant. On
the contrary, they come and go. One generation is dominated by re
tributivists, another by believers in rehabilitation, a third by propo
nents of deterrence, then the cycle begins again. Short-lived theories
are not good explanations for long-lived practices.
Huigens' response is presumably that consequentialism is not
short-lived, that it has dominated American law and legal theory since
Bentham's time. Perhaps so. But any label that fits legal thought of
both the 1890s and the 1990s, that captures the essence of both
Herbert Wechsler's Model Penal Code and Stephen Breyer's
sentencing guidelines, is too capacious to do much work. Huigens
plainly believes there has been a large shift in the reigning theory over
the past thirty years or so.28 But there has been no significant change
in criminal law's expansive trend during that time. Criminal liability
rules expanded in Langdell's day, in Wechsler's day, and in the present
day. It seems odd that a theory that changes shape so radically would
produce such a constant phenomenon.
There is another problem. Huigens seems to believe that develop
ments in sentencing practice flow out of the same intellectual trend
that drives changes in criminal law.29 But sentencing levels in the
United States have not been constant; they have fluctuated considera
bly over time. In 190 4 , the United States incarcerated 69 people per
10 0, 000 population.30 In 1923 - the middle of Prohibition - that
number had grown only modestly, to 73. By194 0, it had mushroomed
to125; the Great Depression saw a lot more incarceration than did the
Roaring Twenties. That figure held constant for the next twenty years.
Then, from 1960 to 1970, it fell from 125 to 97 (even while crime was
rising sharply). Beginning in the mid-1970s, the prison population be
gan to explode, as the index rose to141in1980, to 298in 1990, and to
41
1in1995.
I do not believe that intellectual developments - the decline of
one theory of punishment, the rise of another - are the key that
unlocks these figures, though I might be wrong about that. One thing,
however, should be clear: the same intellectual trends cannot explain
28. See Huigens, supra note 1, at 820 (discussing the "shift from the rehabilitative,
indeterminate sentencing philosophy exemplified in the Model Penal Code to the incapacita
tive, determinate sentencing philosophy exemplified in the Federal Sentencing Guidelines").
29. Thus, he couples his criticism of the Model Penal Code's focus on cognition with his
criticism of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines' use of revealed preferences. Id. at 820-22.
The idea is that both phenomena spring from the same root.
30. To calculate the figures in this paragraph, I used the following sources. For prison
populations up to 1970, see MARGARET WERNER CAHALAN, HISTORICAL CORRECTIONS
STATISTICS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1850-1984, at 29 tbl.3-2 (1986). For the prison popula
tions from 1980 forward, see Bureau of Justice Statistics, Corrections Populations in the
United States, available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/abstract/cpius.htm. For the tot�I
population throughout the relevant period, I used census data, available online at
http://eire.census.gov/popest/archives/prel 980/popclockest.txt.
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both the fluctuations in the prison population and the steady rise in
criminalization.
What, then, is the source of criminal law's steady growth, and of
the criminal justice system's equally steady march toward lawlessness?
No single answer suffices; law and legal institutions are too complex
for that. Still, one part of the answer seems easy enough. Legislators
and prosecutors have acted, and no doubt will continue to act, in ways
that are natural given the institutional and legal framework that
surrounds them. The problem lies in that framework.
Legislators voting on criminal statutes face asymmetric political
costs.31 If they criminalize too little, there is some possibility, however
small, that they will be blamed for not giving police and prosecutors
the necessary tools to deal with crime. If they criminalize too much,
the only risk is that law enforcers will go after defendants who attract
public sympathy - the Ken Starr I Bill Clinton scenario. But as that
episode showed, the public blames the overzealous prosecutor in such
cases, not the overcriminalizing legislator. Overcriminalization,
whether strategic or symbolic, thus looks costless to lawmakers. This
asymmetry is aggravated by another: it is much cheaper for interest
groups to lobby for criminal legislation than against it. This inverts the
usual dynamic, where legislation is easier to block than to generate.
Plus, the most important interest group is law enforcers - police and
prosecutors. They benefit from broader criminal prohibitions, which
allow police officers to justify stops and arrests more easily (hence the
appeal of loitering laws) and prosecutors to induce guilty pleas more
readily. More guilty pleas make prosecutors' jobs easier, and have the
added benefit of raising their conviction rate.32
That is the pathology. And this disease is degenerative: if everyone
in the criminal justice system continues to do what comes naturally,
the problem will continue to get worse.

31. The points in this paragraph are developed at greater length in Stuntz, supra note 2,
at 547-57.
32. Huigens says that my argument "reduce[s] ultimately to one piece of logic: if convic
tion is easier, then more people will be convicted and imprisoned." Huigens, supra note 1, at
819. He then goes on to pose the question "why this should be anyone's objective." Id.
I do not accept this characterization of my argument. The reality is more complicated
than a drive to maximize the prison population. When they pass criminal statutes, legisla
tures delegate power to prosecutors. In any delegation of power, there is some potential for
the agent to deviate from the wishes of the principal. As I explained in my article, the largest
such agency cost is that prosecutors will prosecute too little. See Stuntz, supra note 2, at
549-52. That will generally be true whether crime rates are high or low. The point is not that
everyone (or anyone) wants to send as many people as possible to prison. Rather, the point
is that prosecutors have an incentive to prosecute fewer people than legislatures would like
- however high or low the latter level is. See id.; William J. Stuntz, Substance, Process, and
the Civil- Criminal Line, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 1, 16-19 (1996).
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The system's attachment to a particular vision of the rule of law
has the effect of locking in this perverse dynamic.33 The ban on
common-law crimes allocates crime definition to legislatures, even
though legislatures have proved much more eager than courts to ex
pand criminal liability. The ban on ex post facto crimes reinforces that
allocation - legislatures, unlike courts, act prospectively as a matter
of course. Vagueness doctrine seems to restrict legislatures, by re
quiring specificity when defining crimes. Actually, it restricts courts,
by barring open-ended crimes that require substantial judicial defini
tion. The rule of lenity seems to protect defendants against unfair sur
prise by resolving interpretive doubts in defendants' favor. But that
rule only encourages legislatures to resolve doubts against defendants
in advance. Taken together, these doctrines encourage legislatures to
create more, and more particular, new crimes - many of which will
naturally overlap existing crimes, thereby giving prosecutors more op
portunities to stack charges. The more new crimes are created, the
easier will be the process of extracting guilty pleas, and the fewer op
portunities courts will have to define the boundaries of criminal pro
hibitions. As criminal codes grow, courts' power fades, and criminal
law becomes, increasingly, a matter of legislative delegation and
prosecutorial choice.
The most obvious corrective is to give judges more discretion, in
order to check prosecutors' discretion. Judicial discretion is of course
in tension with rule-of-law norms, both because it weakens legislative
supremacy and because it is necessarily open-ended. But it would
make criminal litigation more lawlike, not less so. Consider a recent
example: Bill Clinton's impeachment and his subsequent Senate trial
and acquittal.34 The decision to impeach Clinton was made by the
House of Representatives, a majority of which concluded that Clinton
had committed serious crimes that justified removing him from office.
The Senate may have agreed that Clinton violated the governing fed
eral criminal statutes, but concluded that those violations did not merit
removal fr om office. Notice the nature of the Senate's acquittal:
Clinton probably did commit federal crimes, but not the sort of crimes
that deserve formal punishment, and certainly not the sort of crimes
that merit removal of a sitting President. In less technical terms, one
might say that Clinton was a liar, but not the sort of liar who should go
to prison or, in the case of a high-ranking public official, be forced to
quit his job.
The hard issue in Clinton's case was not whether he violated
federal statutes, but whether those violations were serious enough to
justify kicking him out of the White House. A.lot of criminal prosecu33. The points in this paragraph are developed at greater length in Stuntz, supra note 2,
at 559-65, 578-79.
34. For an excellent account, see POSNER, supra note 24, at 59-132.
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tions are similar: the hard issue is not whether the defendant commit
ted the crime charged (or one of them), but whether criminal punish
ment is merited. In Clinton's case, that issue was decided both by the
"prosecution" (Ken Starr's office and the House of Representatives)
and by the "court" (the Senate). In ordinary criminal litigation, only
the prosecutor gets to decide; the court is limited to the question
whether the criminal statute has been transgressed. Which system is
more lawlike? The one in which a court wrestles with the key issue in
the case, or the one in which the prosecutor alone decides - without
formal argument, a record, or appellate review? The question answers
itself. As it is conventionally understood, the rule of law bars courts
from making such vague, open-ended, discretionary judgments about
desert and punishment. But that bar does not do away with open
ended discretion. Rather, it leaves the discretion in prosecutors'
hands, subject to no review by anyone else. The system that looks
more lawlike is actually less so.35
We would do well to have courts exercise the kind of power the
Senate exercised in Clinton's case. That would go some distance
toward reining in abusive prosecutions, as it did in that case. Better
still, it would reduce law enforcers' incentive to seek, and legislators'
incentive to enact, ever more expansive criminal prohibitions.
III. CONCLUSION
The problem with American criminal law is not that it embraces
the wrong theory of punishment. Theories of punishment have more
to do with criminal sentencing and mens rea - two topics that
Huigens focuses on in his essay36 - than with the definition of
criminal acts. Yet criminal law has expanded precisely by adding ever
more prohibited conduct to the criminal code. Nor is the problem that
voters and politicians are too tough on criminal defendants (though
they probably are). Even when crime was not the headline issue it has
been for the past few decades, criminal law expanded and prosecuto-

35. Huigens and I agree that (in his words) "[t]he existence of discretion, somewhere in
the system, to make a context-sensitive evaluation of the offender's conduct and character is
intrinsic to criminal law because context-specific, retrospective assessments of the offender
and his wrongdoing are intrinsic to just punishment." Huigens, supra note 1, at 818. Discre
tion cannot be eliminated. If it could, and if we eliminated it, we would live in a less just so
ciety. l did not intend to suggest anything to the contrary in my article; if I did so, it was a
result of poor expression, not conscious choice. The rule-of-law problem with the criminal
justice system is not that the system allows prosecutors to exercise discretion; it is that prose
cutors' discretion goes unchecked. The best check would be judicial discretion. That is how
checks and balances are supposed to work: discretion by one branch checks discretion by
another.
36. See Huigens, supra note l, at 820-22 {discussing the Model Penal Code's culpability
structure and its emphasis on cognition, and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines' focus on
revealed preferences when setting sentencing levels).
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rial power grew. Unless something else changes, the same thing will
continue to happen when crime is again a small political issue. Rather,
the problem is that strong legislative supremacy and strong prosecuto
rial discretion don't mix - they produce the kind of power imbalance
that reinforces rather than corrects itself. The combination must be
broken. If it isn't, we will continue to see ever more criminal laws, and
ever less criminal law.

